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Abstract
Previous research has given inconsistent evidence about whether familiar metonyms are more
difficult to process than literal expressions. In two eye-tracking while reading experiments, we
tested the hypothesis that the difficulty associated with processing metonyms would depend on
sentence structure. Experiment 1 examined comprehension of familiar place-for-institution
metonyms (e.g., college) when they were an argument of the main verb and showed that they are
more difficult to process in a figurative context (e.g., offended the college) than in a literal context
(e.g., photographed the college). Experiment 2 demonstrated that when they are arguments of the
main verb, familiar metonyms are more difficult to process than frequency-and-length-matched
nouns that refer to people (e.g., offended the leader), but that this difficulty was reduced when the
metonym appeared as part of an adjunct phrase (e.g., offended the honor of the college). The
results support the view that figurative-language processing is moderated by sentence structure.
When the metonym was an argument of the verb, the results were consistent with the pattern
predicted by the indirect-access model of figurative-language comprehension. In contrast, when
the metonym was part of an adjunct phrase, the results were consistent with the pattern predicted
by the direct-access model.
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In everyday language comprehension we frequently encounter words that have multiple
related meanings. For example, the word college can be used to refer to the physical space
occupied by an institution of higher education, as in Peter decided to leave the bike path and
cut through the college, or it can refer to the administration or other governing board of the
institution, as in Peter decided to petition the college to install more bike racks. This latter
example illustrates metonymy, a common type of figurative language in which some entity
(e.g., the administration of a university) is referred to by some salient characteristic of that
entity (e.g., college). Specifically, petition the college constitutes a place-for-institution
metonym, where college does not refer to the literal, physical place, but rather to the larger
institution associated with that place (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Other types of metonymy
have also been documented. For example, the sentence The ham sandwich is sitting at table
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20 contains an object-used-for-user metonym, where ham sandwich does not refer to the
literal sandwich, but rather to the customer who ordered the ham sandwich (Nunberg, 1978).
The manner in which metonymic expressions are understood factors into a general debate in
the psycholinguistic literature over how we process figurative language. At a broad level,
accounts of figurative-language processing differ in their predictions regarding the time
course required to access a word’s literal meaning compared to its figurative meaning.
Psycholinguists have characterized the standard pragmatic model (Grice, 1975; Searle,
1979) as an indirect-access model of figurative-language processing in which the literal
meaning of a figurative expression is always accessed before a figurative interpretation is
computed. If there is a mismatch between the literal interpretation and the context of the
sentence, the literal meaning is rejected and a figurative interpretation is adopted instead.
Although this model received some early empirical support (e.g., Clark & Lucy, 1975; Janus
& Bever, 1985), the strict “literal-first” account has been challenged by demonstrations that
when there is sufficient context readers can access figurative interpretations just as quickly
as they can access literal interpretations (e.g., Gerrig & Healy, 1983; Inhoff, Lima, &
Carroll, 1984; Ortony, Schallert, Reynolds, & Antos, 1978; Shinjo & Myers, 1987), and by
demonstrations that certain figurative interpretations are automatically activated, even when
an appropriate literal interpretation is available (Gildea & Glucksberg, 1983; Glucksberg,
Gildea, & Bookin, 1982; Keysar, 1989). These findings have been taken as evidence for a
direct-access model (Gibbs, 1994; Gibbs & Gerrig, 1989; Glucksberg, 1991, 2003)
according to which neither a literal nor a figurative interpretation takes priority, but where
contextual and lexical information interact immediately, allowing rapid selection of the
intended meaning of a word. With increasing evidence that familiar figurative expressions
are not necessarily more difficult to process than literal expressions (for reviews, see
Glucksberg, 2001, 2003), researchers have shifted from the indirect-access model and
toward the direct-access model.
Models of figurative-language processing have been based primarily on the comprehension
of metaphor, with very few experimental studies examining the processing of metonymy.
Some evidence suggests that familiar metonyms are no more difficult to process than literal
expressions. Frisson and Pickering (1999) conducted two eye-tracking while reading
experiments that investigated the processing of familiar versus unfamiliar metonyms that
appeared in either a literal or figurative context. In their Experiment 1, participants read
sentences like those presented in (1). Here, college is a familiar place-for-institution
metonym that can easily appear in either a literal context (1a) or a figurative context (1c). In
contrast, pyramid has no familiar metonymic sense, and so it can easily appear in a literal
context (1b), but it has no straightforward interpretation when it appears in a figurative
context (1d).
(1a) The photographer stepped inside the college after he had received an official
invitation.
(1b) The photographer stepped inside the pyramid after he had received an official
invitation.
(1c) That bright boy was rejected by the college after he had bribed some crooked
officials.
(1d) That bright boy was rejected by the pyramid after he had bribed some crooked
officials.
Reading times on both the critical noun phrase (NP) and on the postnoun region revealed
substantial processing difficulty when an unfamiliar metonym appeared in a figurative
context (1d) compared to the other three conditions. In contrast, there was only weak
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evidence that the familiar metonym in a figurative context (1c) was more difficult than in a
literal context (1a), and this effect emerged relatively late in the eye-tracking record. Frisson
and Pickering’s Experiment 2 found a similar pattern of results using familiar and non-
familiar place-for-event metonyms (e.g., Vietnam can refer literally to the country or
figuratively to the Vietnam war, whereas Finland has no familiar metonymic sense). Frisson
and Pickering interpreted these results as supporting an account of figurative-language
processing in which readers do not initially distinguish between the literal and figurative
meaning of a familiar metonym, but rather adopt a single, underspecified meaning and only
later activate the intended sense. This account differs from earlier direct-access models
(Gibbs, 1994; Gibbs & Gerrig, 1989; Glucksberg, 1991, 2003): whereas a direct-access
account proposes that similar processing patterns for literal and figurative expressions are
the result of the rapid influence of sentence context, the underspecification account instead
argues that there is no difference between the processing of literal and figurative expressions
because the reader does not make a strong initial commitment to either interpretation (for
further discussion of the underspecification approach, see Frisson, 2009; Frisson &
Pickering, 2001). Additional work has supported the idea that familiar metonymic
interpretations are no more difficult to access than literal interpretations for both young and
older adults (Humphrey, Kemper, & Radel, 2004) and in cases of producer-for-product
metonyms (Frisson & Pickering, 2007; McElree, Frisson, & Pickering, 2006).
In contrast, other studies present evidence that the figurative meaning of a metonym is more
difficult to access than its literal meaning. Gibbs (1990) presented participants with short
narratives (e.g., a story about an incompetent surgeon) where the final sentence contained a
referring expression that could be literal, metaphoric, or metonymic (e.g., The doctor/
butcher/scalpel was sued for malpractice). He found that participants had the least difficulty
establishing an antecedent in the literal condition compared to the two figurative conditions.
However, participants were significantly slower in the metonymic condition compared to the
metaphoric condition, leading Gibbs to conclude that metonymic referential expressions are
more difficult to understand than other types of referential expressions (see also Onishi &
Murphy, 1993). Frisson and Pickering (1999) noted that Gibbs did not make a distinction
between sense selection and sense creation. That is, the metonym condition in this study
may have been more difficult than the others because readers are not used to referring to a
doctor as a scalpel, and so they had to generate this novel sense of the word. This contrasts
with a familiar metonym (e.g., college), where readers do not have to generate the meaning,
but rather select it among several possible senses (see Clark & Gerrig, 1983; Gerrig, 1989).
Additional research using neuroimaging (Rapp, Erb, Grodd, Bartels, & Markert, 2011),
electrophysiology (Weiland, Bambini, & Schumacher, 2012), and speed-accuracy trade-off
methodology (Ghio, Bott, Schumacher, & Bambini, 2012) has also shown clear differences
in the processing of metonymic versus literal expressions.
In this paper, we propose that metonymic processing is influenced by sentence structure,
which determines whether processing conforms to predictions derived from the indirect-
access model or the direct-access model. This approach is consistent with a variety of
psycholinguistic perspectives that have proposed that sentence structure guides the depth at
which language comprehenders interpret referential expressions and relations between parts
of a sentence (e.g., Baker & Wagner, 1987; Ferreira, Bailey, & Ferraro, 2002; Gordon &
Hendrick, 1998; Sanford & Sturt, 2002). In particular, we test the hypothesis that metonyms
are more difficult to process than literal expressions when they appear as an argument of a
verb, but that this processing difficulty is reduced when the metonym appears as part of an
adjunct phrase. This hypothesis was driven in part by our recent work (Lowder & Gordon,
2012) showing that changes in sentence structure affect the processing difficulty associated
with integrating an inanimate sentence subject with an action verb (this work pertains to
questions about how noun animacy influences complex-sentence processing: see Gordon &
Lowder and Gordon Page 3













Lowder, 2012, Traxler, Morris, & Seely, 2002; Traxler, Williams, Blozis, & Morris, 2005;
and questions about how information specified by arguments and adjuncts is processed:
Boland & Blodgett, 2006; Clifton, Speer, & Abney, 1991; Schutze & Gibson, 1999; Speer &
Clifton, 1998). Lowder and Gordon recorded participants’ eye movements while they read
sentences like those in (2), where the sentence subject was either animate or inanimate and
where an action verb appeared as either the main verb of the sentence or as part of a relative
clause (i.e., an adjunct phrase). Lowder and Gordon found substantial processing difficulty
at the verb for inanimate subjects versus animate subjects in a simple sentence context (2b
versus 2a); however, there was no such animacy difference when the action verb was
embedded in a relative clause (2d versus 2c)1. This work demonstrated an important role for
sentence structure in subject-verb integration. That is, the pairing of an inanimate subject
with an action verb (e.g., The pistol injured) is difficult when this relationship is focused by
virtue of being in the main clause of the sentence. In contrast, this difficulty is reduced when
the integration takes place within a relative clause (e.g., The pistol that injured), presumably
because the structure of the sentence signals to the reader that the information in this adjunct
phrase is less important and thus requires less attention than the new information being
asserted in the main clause of the sentence. This work also suggests that there may be other
semantic characteristics of a sentence aside from animacy whose ease or difficulty of
processing depends critically on sentence structure.
(2a) The cowboy concealed the pistol last night in the saloon.
(2b) The pistol injured the cowboy last night in the saloon.
(2c) The cowboy that concealed the pistol was known to be unreliable.
(2d) The pistol that injured the cowboy was known to be unreliable.
The notion that interactions between semantics and syntax of the sort reported by Lowder
and Gordon (2012) might extend into research on figurative language is supported by the
observation that several of the inanimate critical nouns used in that study could be
interpreted metonymically (although in most cases the metonymic sense of the inanimate
noun likely has to be created, rather than selected from an established metonymic sense).
For example, an inanimate subject-verb pair such as pistol injured in (2b) resembles what
Lakoff and Johnson (1980) called object-used-for-user-metonyms (e.g., The gun he hired
wanted fifty grand), where in this case pistol could stand for the man who was holding the
pistol or someone’s shooting of the pistol (other examples of object-used-for-user metonyms
from Lowder and Gordon include the revolver shot and the wrench bruised). In line with this
perspective, Pustejovsky (1995) has proposed that sentences like (3b) require a metonymic
interpretation. Whereas the animate entity John can easily be integrated with an action verb
like killed in (3a), Pustejovsky proposes that we instead process (3b) by type-shifting the
inanimate entity the gun from an object to an event involving an animate agent (e.g.,
someone’s shooting of the gun). This semantic type-shifting process is called coercion.
(3a) John killed Mary.
(3b) The gun killed Mary.
We propose that inanimate subject-verb integration, coercion, metonymic processing, and
other types of figurative language share a common source of processing difficulty in that
1The greater processing difficulty for sentences like (2b) versus (2a) is unlikely to be due to temporary ambiguity at the verb between
a main clause interpretation and a reduced-relative clause interpretation. First, the inanimate nouns used in Lowder and Gordon (2012)
could not plausibly serve as the patient of an action verb (e.g., The pistol injured by the cowboy… is anomalous). More importantly,
the greater difficulty observed in sentences like (2b) compared to (2d) was completely localized to the verb. If readers had entertained
the possibility of a reduced-relative interpretation in (2b), then greater processing difficulty should have been observed on the
subsequent, unambiguous NP (e.g., the cowboy) for (2b) compared to (2d).
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they all require that a word be given a noncanonical semantic interpretation so that it makes
sense in relation to the meanings of other parts of the sentence. Sentence structure acts as
one of several factors that can either emphasize or deemphasize the relevant semantic
relation and therefore the need to make the noncanonical interpretation. In other words, a
reader’s limited attentional resources are guided to a large extent by sentence structure, such
that certain elements and relations are processed deeply at the expense of other elements and
relations. Specifically, when these sentential elements appear as arguments of a verb, their
interpretation is critical to the overall coherence of the sentence, and so they are processed at
a deep level, which leads to processing difficulty. In contrast, when these sentential elements
are embedded in an adjunct phrase, they are seen as being less important to the meaning of
the sentence, and so they are processed less deeply. This occurs because adjuncts are
modifiers, and their interpretation does not depend strongly on the interpretation of the
heads they modify (Schutze & Gibson, 1999). In addition, an adjunct phrase may signal to
the reader that the information it contains is presupposed, and thus is not as important to
focus on as the “new” information being asserted in the main clause of the sentence. We
address several possible mechanisms that may explain differences in depth of processing in
the General Discussion.
Lowder and Gordon’s (2012) finding of greater processing difficulty for (2b) versus (2a)
demonstrates that noncanonical arguments in the form of inanimate subjects cause
processing difficulty when combined with an action verb. Critically, this cost is reduced
when the subject-verb integration takes place in an adjunct phrase. The current paper
extends these findings to figurative-language processing by demonstrating that the figurative
interpretation of a metonym is more difficult to process than a literal expression when the
critical word appears as the argument of the verb, but that this difference is reduced when
the critical word is embedded in an adjunct phrase.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 employed the metonyms and the basic design of Frisson and Pickering (1999)
but modified their stimulus sentences so that the critical metonym was always an argument
of the verb. As discussed above, Frisson and Pickering’s Experiment 1 investigated the
processing of place-for-institution metonyms as shown in (1; repeated here).
(1a) The photographer stepped inside the college after he had received an official
invitation. (Literal-Familiar)
(1b) The photographer stepped inside the pyramid after he had received an official
invitation. (Literal-Unfamiliar)
(1c) That bright boy was rejected by the college after he had bribed some crooked
officials. (Metonymic-Familiar)
(1d) That bright boy was rejected by the pyramid after he had bribed some crooked
officials. (Metonymic-Unfamiliar)
The critical NP in (1a) and (1c) is the college. In (1a), college is interpreted literally (i.e., the
physical college campus), whereas in (1c), college is interpreted figuratively (i.e., the people
who make up the admissions committee at the college). The critical NP in (1b) and (1d) is
the pyramid. In (1b), pyramid is interpreted literally; however, there is no familiar
metonymic sense associated with pyramid, and so (1d) is anomalous. We use the labels
Literal and Metonymic to refer to the sentence context in which the critical word appears.
We use the labels Familiar and Unfamiliar to refer to whether the target word has a familiar
metonymic sense or not.
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Whereas the indirect-access model predicts greater difficulty processing (1c) compared to
(1a), the direct-access model predicts that there should be no difference. Frisson and
Pickering (1999) tested these predictions in an eye-tracking while reading experiment using
sentences like in (1). Across several eye-tracking measures, they found robust context-by-
metonym-familiarity interactions on the region immediately before the critical NP, on the
critical NP itself, and on the region immediately following the critical NP. Follow-up
analyses showed that the driving force behind these interactions was extreme processing
difficulty associated with the Metonymic-Unfamiliar condition (e.g., rejected by the
pyramid), which led Frisson and Pickering to conclude that whereas unfamiliar metonyms
are difficult to process, familiar metonyms are processed very easily whether they appear in
a literal or figurative context. Of particular interest, the greater difficulty for the Metonymic-
Unfamiliar condition over the other three conditions emerged in first-pass reading of the
critical NP, suggesting that early stages of lexical access are sensitive to metonymic
processing. Whereas lexical access was difficult for a word that was used in an unfamiliar
metonymic context compared to when it was used in its literal context (e.g., rejected by the
pyramid versus stepped inside the pyramid), there was no difference when the critical word
had a familiar metonymic sense (e.g., rejected by the college versus stepped inside the
college). This outcome supports the direct-access model in showing that readers used the
context of the sentence to rapidly determine which sense of a familiar metonym to select;
because there is no familiar figurative sense associated with pyramid, a process of sense
creation must take place. The results also support Frisson and Pickering’s underspecification
model, where the reader initially activates only an underspecified meaning of a familiar
metonym and later selects the appropriate sense.
Notwithstanding this conclusion, Frisson and Pickering (1999) did obtain some evidence
that Metonymic-Familiar (e.g., rejected by the college) was more difficult than Literal-
Familiar (stepped inside the college). Specifically, they found that readers were more likely
to regress to earlier regions of the sentence after having read the critical NP in the
Metonymic-Familiar compared to the Literal-Familiar. Also, there was evidence for greater
total reading times for the Metonymic-Familiar condition than for the Literal-Familiar
condition on both the critical NP as well as the region immediately following it. Frisson and
Pickering acknowledge these differences, but note that these effects were relatively weak.
Furthermore, Frisson and Pickering point out that the greater difficulty associated with the
Metonymic-Unfamiliar condition emerged early in the eye-tracking record, whereas the
smaller difference between the Metonymic-Familiar and Literal-Familiar conditions did not
emerge until later processing measures. Thus, Frisson and Pickering claim that their results
offer only weak support for the indirect-access model.
In Experiment 1 we tested the hypothesis that a clear processing difference between familiar
metonyms used in their literal versus figurative contexts would emerge in a set of materials
that more carefully controls the sentence position of the critical NP (see 4 for an example).
Specifically, we modified Frisson and Pickering’s (1999) materials in two important ways.
First, we rewrote the verb phrase of each set of items such that the critical NP would always
appear as the object of the verb. Although this was already the case in some of Frisson and
Pickering’s materials (e.g., the famous drug smuggler provoked the court; the grateful old
lady thanked the store), it was more often the case that the critical NP appeared as part of an
adjunct phrase (e.g., the bright boy was rejected by the college; the guards got instructions
from the headquarters), or at least followed a preposition that intervened between the verb
and the noun (e.g., the young expert cooperated with the gallery; that blasphemous young
woman had to answer to the convent). This variability in sentence structure occurred not
only within the figurative contexts, as in the above examples, but also in the literal contexts
(compare, e.g., those angry protestors surrounded the embassy and the cab driver dropped us
off at the treasury). Second, Frisson and Pickering used different sentence frames within a
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set of items to evoke the literal versus figurative sense of the critical word (compare 1a and
1b to 1c and 1d). This was done to allow two items within a set to appear on the same
experimental list (e.g., 1a and 1d were paired together). We take a similar approach to our
design; however, we also constructed additional sentences to increase our total number of
items.
(4a) Sometime in August, the journalist photographed the college after he had received
an official invitation. (Literal-Familiar)
(4b) Sometime in August, the journalist photographed the pyramid after he had received
an official invitation. (Literal-Unfamiliar)
(4c) Sometime in August, the journalist offended the college after he had bribed some
crooked officials. (Metonymic-Familiar)
(4d) Sometime in August, the journalist offended the pyramid after he had bribed some
crooked officials. (Metonymic-Unfamiliar)
As discussed above, Lowder and Gordon (2012) demonstrated that sentence structure
moderates semantic integration, with processing difficulty emerging when a noncanonical
argument is paired with an action verb. Similarly, we predicted that readers would
experience difficulty processing both familiar and unfamiliar metonyms when the critical
word appeared as an argument of the verb. Critically, because the metonym involves a
noncanonical interpretation and is focused by virtue of its being an argument of the verb,
this greater difficulty for metonyms used in a figurative versus a literal context should
emerge early in the eye-tracking record and should not depend on familiarity of the
metonym. Based on the results of Frisson and Pickering (1999), we also predicted that
readers would experience greater difficulty processing unfamiliar metonyms compared to
familiar metonyms, but we expected this difficulty to emerge relatively late in the eye-
tracking record.
Method
Participants—Twenty-eight students at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
participated in this experiment in exchange for course credit. They were all native English
speakers and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Materials—Each participant was presented with 32 experimental sentences and 92 filler
sentences. The experimental sentences were adapted from Frisson and Pickering (1999,
Experiment 1). Everything from the critical NP to the end of the sentence was identical to
the materials used by Frisson and Pickering. Critically, we changed the verb phrases such
that they always consisted of only one word, which would then take the critical NP as its
object. This required us to change the sentence subject in some cases, but not in others.
Finally, we began every sentence with a locative phrase. See (4) for an example.
Each set of items was yoked to another set of items that contained the same verbs and
critical NPs but contained a different locative phrase and a different sentence subject (see 5).
This was done to allow pairing of items across four lists, but to also maintain tight
experimental control. Thus, in constructing our counterbalanced lists, (4a) and (5d) always
appeared together, as did (4b) and (5c), and so on. See Appendix A for a full list of
materials.
(5a) Over the summer, the writer photographed the college after he had received an
official invitation. (Literal-Familiar)
(5b) Over the summer, the writer photographed the pyramid after he had received an
official invitation. (Literal-Unfamiliar)
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(5c) Over the summer, the writer offended the college after he had bribed some
crooked officials. (Metonymic-Familiar)
(5d) Over the summer, the writer offended the pyramid after he had bribed some
crooked officials. (Metonymic-Unfamiliar)
The critical nouns we used (e.g., college versus pyramid) came directly from Frisson and
Pickering (1999), who had carefully balanced them for frequency and length. Likewise, we
selected verbs for the literal and metonymic contexts that did not differ significantly in
frequency, t(30) = 1.17, p > .24 (SUBTLEXus database, Brysbaert & New, 2009), and that
were identical in length. Frisson and Pickering had demonstrated that there were no
differences in average frequencies of the literal and figurative senses of the familiar
metonyms.
Plausibility norming—To test for differences in plausibility among the four conditions,
we presented the stimuli from Experiment 1 up to and including the critical noun (e.g., Over
the summer, the writer photographed the college.) to 20 participants who did not participate
in the eye-tracking experiment. There were four versions of each list that were
counterbalanced into the same lists used for the eye-tracking experiment. Each list also
contained filler sentences. Participants were instructed to indicate how likely they believed
the events described by the sentence were on a scale from 1 (highly unlikely) to 7 (highly
likely). Each participant saw the sentences in a different random order. The mean ratings for
each condition were 5.5 (Literal-Familiar), 5.5 (Literal-Unfamiliar), 4.7 (Metonymic-
Familiar), and 2.4 (Metonymic-Unfamiliar). All pairwise comparisons differed significantly
from each other except for the two Literal conditions, all ts > 2.6, all ps < .05. This pattern
of plausibility results is identical to the pattern obtained by Frisson and Pickering (1999).
Although the Literal-Familiar and Metonymic-Familiar conditions were significantly
different from one another, the magnitude of this difference was quite small, especially
compared to the larger difference between the Metonymic-Familiar and Metonymic-
Unfamiliar conditions (see also Footnote 2).
Predictability—A group of 16 participants, none of whom participated in any other aspect
of the study, were presented with the stimuli from Experiment 1 up to and including the
determiner before the critical noun (e.g., Over the summer, the writer photographed the …)
and were instructed to complete each fragment. The fragments were presented in one of four
possible orderings. Participants’ responses were then compared with the actual experimental
stimuli to assess how predictable the critical words were. The percentages of responses that
matched the critical words were extremely low across all conditions: 0.4% (Literal-
Familiar), 0.4% (Literal-Unfamiliar), 1.2% (Metonymic-Familiar), and 0% (Metonymic-
Unfamiliar).
Procedure—Participants’ eye movements were recorded with an EyeLink 1000 system
(SR Research) at a sampling rate of 1000 Hz with a headrest used to minimize movement.
At the start of each trial, a fixation point was presented near the left edge of the monitor,
marking the location where the first word of the sentence would appear. When the
participant fixated this point, the experimenter pressed a button that replaced the fixation
point with the sentence. After reading the sentence, the participant pressed a key, which
made the sentence disappear and a true-false comprehension question appear. Participants
pressed one key to answer “true,” and another key to answer “false.” A comprehension
question followed every sentence.
Each experimental session began with four filler sentences. After this warm-up block, the
remaining 120 sentences were presented in a different random order for each participant.
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Analysis—Data analysis focused on four standard eye-movement measures. Gaze duration
is the sum of all initial fixations on a region; it begins when the region is first fixated and
ends when gaze is directed away from the region, either to the left or right. Right-bounded
reading time (also called quasi-first pass time) is similar to gaze duration, except it ends
when gaze is directed away from the region to the right. This measure is not discussed as
often as the others reported here, but it has nevertheless been used in several eye-tracking
while reading studies (e.g., Betancort, Carreiras, & Sturt, 2009; Gordon, Hendrick, Johnson,
& Lee, 2006; Lee, Lee, & Gordon, 2007; Traxler et al., 2002). Regression-path duration
(also called go-past time) is the sum of all fixations beginning with the initial fixation on a
region and ending when the gaze is directed away from the region to the right. Thus,
regression-path duration includes right-bounded reading time, but also includes any
regressive fixations to earlier parts of the sentence. Total time is the sum of all fixations on a
word or region. For our analyses of these measures, we excluded 0-ms times, which occur
when a critical region is skipped during first pass (e.g., Frisson & Pickering, 1999; Pickering
& Traxler, 1998, 2001). Throughout the paper, we use gaze duration to assess the earliest
stages of processing, right-bounded reading time and regression-path duration to assess
intermediate stages of processing, and total time to assess global processing difficulty.
We report reading times for three regions of interest. The prenoun region consisted of the
subject of the sentence (bare noun only) and the main verb (e.g., journalist photographed/
journalist offended). The critical NP consisted of the target word along with the determiner
(e.g., the college/the pyramid). The postnoun region consisted of the three words following
the critical NP in most cases (e.g., after he had). Note that these words are the same across
the literal and metonymic conditions. In four of our item sets, only two words remained
constant between conditions. Following Frisson and Pickering (1999), the postnoun region
for those items consisted of only those two words. When two or more consecutive regions
were skipped during first pass, the trial was excluded.
An automatic procedure in the Eyelink software combined fixations that were shorter than
80 ms and within one character of another fixation into one fixation. Additional fixations
shorter than 80 ms and longer than 1,000 ms were removed. For all reading-time measures,
we set minimum cutoff values at 120 ms. Maximum cutoff values were set at 1,500 ms for
gaze duration and 3,000 ms for all other measures (for similar approaches see, e.g., Frisson
& McElree, 2008; Frisson & Pickering, 2007; McElree et al., 2006; Tooley, Traxler, &
Swaab, 2009; Traxler, 2009; Traxler & Tooley, 2008). This procedure eliminated 1.6% of
the data.
Results
Comprehension-question accuracy—Mean comprehension-question accuracies for
each condition were as follows: Literal-Familiar (97%), Literal-Unfamiliar (95%),
Metonymic-Familiar (94%), Metonymic-Unfamiliar (90%). Because these values were all
extremely close to the upper limit of the distribution, the data were arcsine-transformed prior
to calculation of inferential statistics (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003; for a similar
approach, see, e.g., Johnson, Lowder, & Gordon, 2011). The analysis revealed a main effect
of context that was only significant in the subject analysis, F1(1, 27) = 8.60, MSE = .10, p
< .01; F2(1, 31) = 2.32, MSE = .30, p > .13. Although this difference was unexpected, we do
not attribute it to differences in the processing of literal versus figurative expressions.
Rather, it is important to note that the comprehension questions following sentences in the
literal condition were different from the questions following sentences in the metonymic
condition due to the differences in sentence frames. Furthermore, the questions following
sentences in the metonymic condition never probed the reader’s interpretation of the critical
word. For example, the question following (5c) and (5d) was, “True or False: The writer was
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of the highest morals.” It thus seems possible that differences in the difficulty of the
questions between the literal and figurative conditions are responsible for the slight
differences in accuracy. However, because this effect did not approach significance in the
item analysis and because accuracy was very high across all conditions, we do not place
much weight on this finding. The main effect of metonym familiarity and the interaction
between context and familiarity were not significant.
Prenoun region—Mean reading times for the three regions of interest are displayed in
Table 1. Reading times from all trials were included, regardless of whether the
comprehension question was answered correctly. No statistically significant main effects or
interactions were observed in the prenoun region for gaze duration, right-bounded reading
time, or regression-path duration, demonstrating that processing difficulty for the four
conditions did not differ prior to encountering the critical NP.
In contrast, the prenoun region showed a robust main effect of context for total time, such
that there were longer reading times on the prenoun region for the metonymic contexts
compared to the literal contexts, F1(1, 27) = 26.91, MSE = 20,276, p < .001; F2(1, 31) =
19.52, MSE = 29,707, p < .001. There was no main effect of metonym familiarity, F1(1, 27)
= 1.94, MSE = 46,948, p > .15; F2(1, 31) = 1.16, MSE = 62,835, p > .25, nor was there any
evidence of a context-by-familiarity interaction, F1(1, 27) < 1; F2(1, 31) < 1. This pattern
suggests that readers experienced processing difficulty when they encountered a noun that
had to be interpreted figuratively, causing them to go back and reread earlier parts of the
sentence.
Critical NP—Measures assessing early and intermediate stages of processing on the critical
NP showed that metonyms were more difficult to process than literal expressions, regardless
of metonym familiarity. Analysis of gaze duration on the critical NP revealed a significant
main effect of context, F1(1, 27) = 8.77, MSE = 3,526, p < .01; F2(1, 31) = 5.91, MSE =
5,922, p < .05, with longer reading times for the metonymic contexts compared to the literal
contexts2. There was no main effect of metonym familiarity, F1(1, 27) < 1; F2(1, 31) < 1,
nor was there a context-by-familiarity interaction, F1(1, 27) = 1.19, MSE = 3,906, p > .28;
F2(1, 31) = 1.13, MSE = 6,716, p > .29.
The main effect of context was also significant in both right-bounded reading time, F1(1, 27)
= 10.04, MSE = 7,934, p < .005; F2(1, 31) = 5.40, MSE = 14,024, p < .05, and in regression-
path duration, F1(1, 27) = 5.80, MSE = 31,365, p < .05; F2(1, 31) = 6.30, MSE = 27,093, p
< .05. These two measures showed no main effects of metonym familiarity and no context-
by-familiarity interaction, all Fs < 1.2. Thus, analysis of gaze duration, right-bounded
reading time, and regression-path duration at the critical NP all suggest greater processing
difficulty when the critical NP appeared in a metonymic context compared to a literal
context, and there was no evidence that familiar metonyms were easier to process than
unfamiliar metonyms2.
In contrast, analysis of total time on the critical NP revealed a significant context-by-
familiarity interaction, F1(1, 27) = 12.27, MSE = 17,169, p < .005; F2(1, 31) = 7.78, MSE =
26,210, p < .01. Follow-up analyses with planned comparisons showed that the Metonymic-
Unfamiliar condition was more difficult than the Literal-Unfamiliar condition, t1(27) = 5.64,
2To determine whether the greater processing difficulty associated with familiar metonyms compared to literal expressions could be
explained by plausibility differences between these two conditions, we correlated the difference in reading times between items in the
Metonymic-Familiar and Literal-Familiar conditions with the difference in their plausibility ratings. This correlation was performed
for all regions of interest on every eye-tracking measure that showed an effect of context. There was no indication that plausibility
differences had any influence on reading times, all rs < .18, all ps > .32.
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p < .001; t2(31) = 5.31, p < .001, but that there was no difference between the Metonymic-
Familiar condition and the Literal-Familiar condition, t1(27) = 1.23, p > .20; t2(31) = 1.19, p
> .20.
Postnoun region—No statistically significant main effects or interactions were observed
for gaze duration in the postnoun region. Analysis of right-bounded reading time in the
postnoun region revealed a significant main effect of context, F1(1, 27) = 7.84, MSE =
6,028, p < .01; F2(1, 31) = 6.90, MSE = 9,479, p < .05 and a marginally significant context-
by-familiarity interaction, F1(1, 27) = 3.33, MSE = 5,847, p < .08; F2(1, 31) = 3.89, MSE =
7,998, p < .06. The context-by-familiarity interaction was fully significant for regression-
path duration, F1(1, 27) = 8.23, MSE = 23,113, p < .01; F2(1, 31) = 6.71, MSE = 32,664, p
< .05. Planned comparisons showed that the Metonymic-Unfamiliar condition was more
difficult than the Literal-Unfamiliar condition, t1(27) = 4.12, p < .001; t2(31) = 3.51, p < .
005, but that there was no difference between the Metonymic-Familiar condition and the
Literal-Familiar condition, t1(27) < 1; t2(31) = < 1. For total time on the postnoun region,
there was a main effect of metonym familiarity that was significant only in the subjects
analysis, F1(1, 27) = 4.44, MSE = 9,878, p < .05; F2(1, 31) = 2.66, MSE = 19,544, p > .10.
There was no significant main effect of context, F1(1, 27) = 2.11, MSE = 14,464, p > .15;
F2(1, 31) = 1.99, MSE = 24,605, p > .15, nor was there a context-by-familiarity interaction,
F1(1, 27) < 1; F2(1, 31) < 1.
Discussion
The results of Experiment 1 show that both familiar and unfamiliar metonyms cause
processing difficulty, but that the difficulty caused by unfamiliar metonyms is more
prolonged than that for familiar metonyms. Measures reflecting early and intermediate
stages of processing (gaze duration, right-bounded reading time, and regression-path
duration) on the critical NP showed that figurative expressions were more difficult than
literal expressions, regardless of the familiarity of the metonym. The greater overall
difficulty for figurative expressions over literal expressions persisted in right-bounded
reading time on the postnoun region, and total time on the prenoun region.
We also found evidence that the Metonymic-Unfamiliar condition (e.g., offended the
pyramid) was more difficult than the Metonymic-Familiar condition (e.g., offended the
college); however, this effect did not emerge until relatively late in the eye-tracking record
(regression-path duration on the postnoun region and total time on the critical NP). This
pattern contrasts with the results reported by Frisson and Pickering (1999), who
demonstrated that greater difficulty processing their Metonymic-Unfamiliar condition (e.g.,
rejected by the pyramid) compared to their Metonymic-Familiar condition (e.g., rejected by
the college) emerged early (i.e., in gaze duration on the critical NP).
The overall pattern of the results of Experiment 1 is consistent with the indirect-access
model of figurative-language processing. According to this model, the literal meaning of a
figurative expression is always accessed before the figurative meaning, which results in
early processing difficulty when a metonym is first encountered—even if the figurative
meaning of the metonym is well-established. However, the model also predicts that readers
should experience longer-lasting difficulty with an unfamiliar metonym compared to a
familiar metonym (Frisson & Pickering, 1999). Presumably this occurs because whereas the
figurative sense of a familiar metonym can be selected among its various possible meanings,
the figurative sense of an unfamiliar metonym must be created, which requires additional
processing time.
We propose that the discrepant findings between the current study and Frisson and Pickering
(1999) can be explained by taking sentence structure into consideration. Whereas the critical
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NPs in our Experiment 1 always appeared as an argument of the main verb of the sentence,
the critical NPs used by Frisson and Pickering varied in their syntactic role, sometimes
occurring as an argument of the verb, but more often appearing as part of an adjunct phrase,
which may have reduced the processing difficulty associated with the metonym. We believe
that this occurs because the structure of our sentences focused the reader’s attention on this
noncanonical semantic relationship, leading to deeper interpretation compared to a sentence
where the metonym and the verb, while related in the sentence, have greater separation
within the structure of the sentence. This notion is consistent with Lowder and Gordon
(2012), who showed that inanimate subject-verb integration is difficult when the subject is
an argument of the main verb of the sentence (e.g., the pistol injured), but that this difficulty
is reduced when the verb is embedded in an adjunct phrase (e.g., the pistol that injured).
This latter finding of Lowder and Gordon leads to the prediction that metonymic processing
difficulty should be reduced when the metonym appears as part of an adjunct phrase
compared to when it is an argument.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 tested the hypothesis of Lowder and Gordon (2012) that sentence structure
guides the depth to which readers interpret meaningful relations between parts of sentences
by examining whether the processing difficulty found in Experiment 1 for familiar
metonyms would be reduced when they appeared as part of an adjunct phrase compared to
when they appeared as an argument of the verb. Specifically, Experiment 2 examined the
processing of sentences like those presented in (6). A comparison of (6c) versus (6d)
provides a test of the hypothesis that metonymic processing depends on sentence structure.
Support for this hypothesis would help reconcile conflicting results on whether there is a
processing cost associated with interpretation of metonyms (Frisson & Pickering, 1999,
2007; Ghio et al., 2012; Gibbs, 1990; Humphrey et al., 2004; McElree et al., 2006; Rapp et
al., 2011; Weiland et al., 2012). In addition Experiment 2 tested whether interpreting
familiar metonyms imposes a processing cost when compared to a different baseline.
Whereas place-for-institution metonyms (e.g., offended the college) refer indirectly to
people (e.g., the individuals who make up the administration of the college), these
metonyms can be substituted with an NP that refers directly to a person or a group of people
(e.g., offended the leader; see 6a and 6b). This comparison offers an additional test of
models of figurative-language processing. Again, whereas the indirect-access model predicts
that readers will encounter difficulty with a metonymic expression compared to a literal
expression, the direct-access model instead predicts that there should be no difference.
(6a) Sometime in August, the journalist offended the leader after he had published
that negative article. (Person-Argument)
(6b) Sometime in August, the journalist offended the honor of the leader after he had
published that negative article. (Person-Adjunct)
(6c) Sometime in August, the journalist offended the college after he had bribed
some crooked officials. (Metonym-Argument)
(6d) Sometime in August, the journalist offended the honor of the college after he
had bribed some crooked officials. (Metonym-Adjunct)
It should be noted that our manipulation of sentence structure also introduces changes in the
semantic content of the sentences in the Argument conditions compared to the Adjunct
conditions. That is, whereas all conditions contain a verb (e.g., offended) that indicates the
need for an animate patient or an entity that can be interpreted as having animate qualities,
the Adjunct conditions also contain an additional content word (e.g., honor) that may further
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cue the reader that the target word should be interpreted as an animate entity. We return to
this issue in the Discussion.
Method
Participants—Forty-four students at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
participated in this experiment in exchange for course credit. They were all native English
speakers and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
Materials—Each participant was presented with 32 experimental sentences and 92 filler
sentences. The experimental sentences were modified versions of the experimental sentences
used in Experiment 1. See (6) for an example. The critical NPs for the metonymic condition
were the same familiar metonyms as those used in Experiment 1 (e.g., the college). In
addition to the metonymic condition, we introduced a condition that directly named a person
(e.g., the leader). The critical NPs could appear as the object of the verb, as in Experiment 1,
or as part of an adjunct phrase. The adjunct condition was constructed by selecting a new NP
that could serve as the object of the verb and that could be attributed either to a person or to
an institution via a prepositional phrase (e.g., the honor of the leader or the honor of the
college). The initial locative phrase and sentence subject were the same as in Experiment 1.
In most cases, the postnoun region of the sentence was the same as in Experiment 1, but
modifications had to be made in some cases to keep the sentence coherent. See Appendix B
for a full list of materials. The critical nouns used for the person condition (e.g., leader)
versus the metonymic condition (e.g., college) did not differ in frequency, t(30) < 1
(SUBTLEXus database, Brysbaert & New, 2009) or length, t(30) < 1.
Plausibility norming—As in Experiment 1, we collected plausibility ratings for the items
used in Experiment 2. Twenty participants who did not participate in any other portion of
this study were presented with the critical sentences up to and including the critical noun.
There were four versions of each list that matched the counterbalancing used for the eye-
tracking experiment. Each list also contained filler sentences. Participants were instructed to
indicate how likely they believed the events described by the sentence were on a scale from
1 (highly unlikely) to 7 (highly likely). Each participant saw the sentences in a different
random order. The mean ratings for each condition were 5.4 (Person-Argument), 5.3
(Person-Adjunct), 5.3 (Metonym-Argument), and 5.3 (Metonym-Adjunct). There were no
significant differences between any condition, all ts < 1.2, all ps > .25. Thus, any differences
in reading times between sentences with people NPs versus metonyms and any influence of
sentence structure on these reading times cannot be attributed to differences in plausibility.
Predictability—The stimuli from Experiment 2 were assessed for predictability of the
critical noun just as described in Experiment 1. Sixteen participants provided sentence
completions. As in Experiment 1, the percentages of responses that matched the critical
words were extremely low across all conditions: 2.7% (Person-Argument), 1.6% (Person-
Adjunct), 0.8% (Metonym-Argument), and 1.6% (Metonym-Adjunct).
Procedure—All aspects of the eye-tracking procedure were identical to Experiment 1.
Analysis—As in Experiment 1, data analysis of Experiment 2 focused on measures of gaze
duration, right-bounded reading time, regression-path duration, and total time. We defined
three regions of interest—the prenoun region, critical NP, and postnoun region—just as we
did in Experiment 1. Finally, we employed the same data-exclusion criteria that were
adopted in Experiment 1, again eliminating 1.6% of the data.
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Comprehension-question accuracy—Mean comprehension-question accuracies for
each condition were as follows: Person-Argument (95%), Person-Adjunct (95%), Metonym-
Argument (94%), Metonym-Adjunct (93%). As in Experiment 2, data were arcsine-
transformed before calculating inferential statistics. There were no significant main effects
or interactions.
Prenoun region—Mean reading times for the three regions of interest are displayed in
Table 2. Reading times from all trials were included, regardless of whether the
comprehension question was answered correctly. No statistically significant main effects or
interactions were observed in the prenoun region for gaze duration, right-bounded reading
time, or regression-path duration, demonstrating that processing difficulty for the four
conditions did not differ prior to encountering the critical NP.
In contrast, there was a main effect of NP type for total time that was significant in the
subject analysis and marginal in the item analysis, F1(1, 43) = 7.56, MSE = 22,131, p < .01;
F2(1, 31) = 3.16, MSE = 43,626, p < .09, indicating that there were longer reading times on
the prenoun region when the critical NP was a metonym compared to when it was a person.
There was no main effect of sentence structure, F1(1, 43) = 1.67, MSE = 28,403, p > .20;
F2(1, 31) = 2.26, MSE = 17,095, p > .14, nor was there an interaction between NP type and
sentence structure, F1(1, 43) = 1.22, MSE = 29,218, p > .25; F2(1, 31) = 1.56, MSE =
19,425, p > .20.
Critical NP—Analysis of gaze duration on the critical NP revealed no significant main
effects or interactions, all ps > .10.
There was a main effect of NP type in right-bounded reading time, F1(1, 43) = 20.73, MSE
= 5,946, p < .001; F2(1, 31) = 5.67, MSE = 16,560, p < .05,with longer reading times on
metonymic NPs compared to NPs that named people. The main effect of sentence structure
was not significant, F1(1, 43) < 1; F2(1, 31) < 1. However, the interaction between NP type
and sentence structure was marginally significant in the subject analysis and fully significant
in the item analysis, F1(1, 43) = 2.70, MSE = 6,746, p = .10; F2(1, 31) = 5.56, MSE = 2,785,
p < .05. Follow-up comparisons revealed that metonymic NPs were more difficult to process
than people NPs when they appeared as an argument of the verb, t1(43) = 5.24, p < .001;
t2(31) = 3.04, p < .01, but that there was no difference when the critical NP appeared as part
of an adjunct phrase, t1(43) = 1.67, p > .10; t2(31) = 1.33, p > .19.
Regression-path duration on the critical NP did not show significant main effects of sentence
structure or NP type. Again, however, the interaction between these two factors was
significant in the item analysis, F1(1, 43) = 1.77, MSE = 25,147, p > .15; F2(1, 31) = 4.95,
MSE = 10,778, p < .05. Follow-up contrasts again showed that metonymic NPs were more
difficult to process than people NPs when they appeared as an argument of the verb, t1(43) =
2.21, p < .05; t2(31) = 2.01, p = .05, but that there was no difference when the critical NP
appeared as part of an adjunct phrase, ts < 1.
Analysis of total time on the critical NP revealed a robust effect of NP type, such that
metonymic NPs were more difficult than people NPs, F1(1, 43) = 35.49, MSE = 11,686, p
< .001; F2(1, 31) = 8.21, MSE = 38,248, p < .01. Once again, there was a marginally
significant interaction between NP type and sentence structure, F1(1, 43) = 2.89, MSE =
13,383, p < .10; F2(1, 31) = 3.35, MSE = 8,923, p < .08. Metonymic NPs were more
difficult than people NPs regardless of whether the NP appeared as an argument of the verb,
t1(43) = 4.71, p < .001; t2(31) = 3.08, p < .005, or as part of an adjunct, t1(43) = 3.31, p < .
005; t2(31) = 2.00, p = .05. In contrast, there was evidence (in the subject analysis) that
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metonymic NPs were more difficult as arguments than adjuncts, t1(43) = 2.10, p < .05;
t2(31) = 1.46, p > .15, but there was no such difference for people NPs, ts < 1.
Thus, measures of right-bounded reading time and total time on the critical NP showed main
effects of NP type such that familiar metonyms were more difficult to process than NPs that
named people. These main effects were qualified by interactions in measures of right-
bounded reading time, regression-path duration, and total time on this region showing that
metonyms were more difficult to process when they appeared as the argument of the verb
than when they appeared as part of an adjunct phrase, but that there was no such effect of
sentence structure on the processing of people NPs.
Postnoun region—Analysis of gaze duration on the postnoun region revealed a main
effect of sentence structure (marginal in the item analysis), F1(1, 43) = 4.15, MSE = 3.782, p
< .05; F2(1, 31) = 3.46, MSE = 5,821, p < .08, with longer reading times on arguments than
adjuncts. There was no main effect of NP type; however, the interaction between NP type
and sentence structure was marginally significant in the subject analysis, F1(1, 43) = 3.52,
MSE = 3,911, p < .07; F2(1, 31) < 1. This pattern was driven by longer gaze durations in the
condition where a person NP appeared as an argument of the verb, relative to the other three
conditions3.
Right-bounded reading time showed a main effect of sentence structure on the postnoun
region, such that arguments were overall more difficult than adjuncts, F1(1, 43) = 6.01, MSE
= 7,622, p < .05; F2(1, 31) = 5.16, MSE = 8,535, p < .05. The main effect of NP type and the
interaction between NP type and sentence structure were not significant.
There was a fully significant interaction between NP type and sentence structure in
regression-path duration on the postnoun region, F1(1, 43) = 4.29, MSE = 19,457, p < .05;
F2(1, 31) = 4.25, MSE = 15,445, p < .05. Follow-up contrasts revealed that metonymic NPs
were more difficult to process than people NPs when they appeared as the object of the verb,
t1(43) = 2.62, p < .05; t2(31) = 2.87, p < .01, but not when they appeared as part of an
adjunct phrase, ts < 1. Furthermore, metonymic NPs were more difficult to process as
arguments than adjuncts, t1(43) = 2.81, p < .01; t2(31) = 2.86, p < .01, whereas there was no
such difference for people NPs, ts < 1. Thus, participants were more likely to experience
processing difficulty in the region immediately following the critical NP when the NP was a
metonym that appeared as an argument, compared to the other three conditions.
Total time on the postnoun region showed a main effect of sentence structure, such that
arguments were more difficult than adjuncts, F1(1, 43) = 11.17, MSE = 12,956, p < .005;
3The pattern observed on this gaze-duration measure is reversed when the more encompassing measure of regression-path duration is
explored, a change which suggests differences across conditions in the likelihood that the eyes moved forward after first-pass reading
of the postnoun region. This suggestion was born out by the finding that the proportion of trials with first-pass regressions from this
region was lowest in the Person-Argument condition (i.e., 9%, compared with 21%, 11%, and 14% in the Metonym-Argument,
Person-Adjunct, and Metonym-Adjunct conditions, respectively). Further, both the number of first-pass fixations on the postnoun
region and their summed durations were greater on trials followed by progressive saccades than by regressive saccades [number of
fixations: F1(1, 43) = 27.36, MSE = 0.55, p < .001; F2(1, 31) = 68.74, MSE = 0.21, p < .001; gaze duration: F1(1, 43) = 13.88, MSE =
44,479, p < .01; F2(1, 31) = 40.62, MSE =16,054, p < .001]. This difference is readily explained as due to readers prematurely
terminating their first-pass reading of the postnoun region in order to return to an earlier region of text when they experienced
difficulty understanding the meaning of those earlier regions. This difficulty was least likely to be experienced in the Person-
Argument condition, which could have the paradoxical effect of elevating average gaze durations for that region relative to the others.
This account was tested by analyzing gaze duration on the postnoun region only for those trials where the eyes progressed after first-
pass reading of the postnoun region. Restricting the analysis in this way completely eliminated the interaction between NP type and
sentence structure, F1(1, 43) < 1; F2(1, 31) < 1.
We also analyzed skipping rates on the critical NP to examine the possibility that the longer gaze durations in the postnoun region for
the Person-Argument condition may have been the result of different fixation patterns for this condition compared to the other
conditions. Skipping rates were as follows: Person-Argument (2%), Metonym-Argument (3%), Person-Adjunct (4%), Metonym-
Adjunct (5%). There were no significant main effects or interactions.
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F2(1, 31) = 7.23, MSE = 15,984, p < .05. The main effect of NP type and the interaction
between NP type and sentence structure were not significant.
Discussion
Experiment 2 replicated the finding from Experiment 1 that metonyms are harder to process
than literal expressions. Whereas Experiment 1 compared familiar metonyms that were used
in their figurative sense (e.g., offended the college) versus their literal sense (e.g.,
photographed the college), Experiment 2 compared familiar metonyms to nouns that
referred directly to people (e.g., offended the leader).
Critically, Experiment 2 also demonstrated that the degree of processing difficulty depends
on sentence structure. Readers experienced greater difficulty with metonymic nouns than
nouns that named people when the critical NP appeared as the object of the verb. In contrast,
when the critical NP appeared as part of an adjunct phrase, the processing difference
between metonyms and people was reduced or eliminated completely. There was evidence
for this interaction effect on the critical NP itself in right-bounded reading time, regression-
path duration, and total time; however, the effect was strongest in regression-path duration
on the postnoun region, indicating a tendency for participants to experience greater
processing difficulty for the Metonym-Argument condition than the other three conditions in
the region immediately following the metonym and then spend extra time going back to
reread earlier parts of the sentence. Our finding of reduced difficulty for the processing of
metonyms that appear as part of an adjunct phrase is consistent with the pattern of effects
predicted by a direct-access model of figurative-language processing.
We propose that metonyms are especially difficult to process when they appear as the
argument of a verb because this position is focused by the sentence structure. Given the verb
offended, the reader needs to understand who offended whom in order to obtain a basic
understanding of the sentence. In this case, the “whom” is an inanimate noun used
metonymically (college), which requires a noncanonical interpretation, leading to extra
processing. In contrast, when the object of the verb is a noun that represents a human
characteristic (honor), this becomes a focus of the sentence, whereas the adjunct phrase (of
the college) is less important and thus is not processed as deeply. As noted above, the
Adjunct condition contained two sources of semantic information that pointed to the need to
interpret the critical NP as having animate qualities (e.g., offended the honor of the college),
whereas the Argument condition contained only one (e.g., offended the college). It could be
argued that this extra semantic material—not the difference in sentence structure—causes
the reduction in processing difficulty. Although the current experiment does not rule out this
possibility, it is not obvious how the mere presence of two sources of semantic information
should lead to easier processing. In fact, it could also be argued that two sources of semantic
information would have the opposite effect, leading the reader to more strongly expect an
animate patient, thereby highlighting the incongruity of a metonymic target word rather than
facilitating its figurative interpretation. The presence of additional semantic material might
aid figurative-language processing in cases where it helps identify the needed figurative
interpretation rather than simply reinforcing the need for such an interpretation. That sort of
facilitation may be operating in the Adjunct condition, where the structure of the sentence
serves to direct the reader’s attention toward a particular feature of the metonym (e.g.,
honor), while deemphasizing the metonym itself.
General Discussion
This study produced three main findings. First, Experiment 1 showed that familiar
metonyms are more difficult to process when they appear in a figurative context (e.g.,
offended the college) than when they appear in a literal context (e.g., photographed the—
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college) an effect that emerged early in the eye-tracking record. Differences in the
processing of familiar metonyms versus unfamiliar metonyms (e.g., offended the pyramid)
did not emerge until late in the eye-tracking record. Second, Experiment 2 showed that the
difficulty associated with processing a familiar metonym (e.g., offended the college) also
emerges when compared against a noun that explicitly names a person (e.g., offended the
leader). Finally, our results demonstrate that the difficulty of processing a familiar metonym
was reduced when it appeared as part of an adjunct phrase (e.g., offended the honor of the
college) compared to when it appeared as an argument of the verb. These findings show that
the pattern of performance predicted by the indirect-access model of figurative-language
processing is found for metonyms that are arguments but that the pattern of performance
predicted by the direct-access model of figurative-language processing is found for
metonyms that are adjuncts.
Findings on Metonymic Processing
Previous research on the processing of metonymy has produced inconsistent results, with
some studies showing that familiar metonyms are no more difficult to process than literal
expressions and others showing that they are more difficult. While these studies have
employed a variety of different methods and have used stimuli that differ on a number of
dimensions, we believe that the moderating effect of sentence structure on metonymic
processing offers a new perspective on how figurative language is processed and helps
explain previous inconsistencies in the literature. As discussed previously, Frisson and
Pickering (1999) found only weak evidence that familiar metonyms (e.g., rejected by the
college) are more difficult to process than literal expressions (e.g., stepped inside the
college), but their target words sometimes appeared as an argument of the verb and
sometimes appeared as part of an adjunct phrase. The results of the current study suggest
that the weak effects reported by Frisson and Pickering, and of other experiments using the
same materials (Humphrey et al., 2004), might be due to structural variation within their
materials. In sentences where the critical word was an argument, metonymic interpretation
may have been more difficult than literal interpretation, whereas it was not so in sentences
where the critical word was an adjunct, with this second type of sentence structure diluting
the impact of the first. Variation in sentence structure might also account for the absence of
differences in the processing of literal expressions and familiar place-for-event or producer-
for-product metonyms (Frisson & Pickering, 1999, Experiment 2; Frisson & Pickering,
2007). In contrast, studies demonstrating greater difficulty in the processing of metonymic
and literal expressions (Gibbs, 1990; Rapp et al., 2011; Weiland et al., 2012) have tended to
use target nouns as arguments of the predicates that induced the metonymic or literal
interpretation (e.g., The scalpel was sued for malpractice; The glove at third base has to be
replaced; Gibbs, 1990).
Nonetheless, it is important to note that using the same method as the current studies, eye-
tracking during reading, McElree et al. (2006) found no evidence of difficulty in
comprehension of producer-for-product metonyms (e.g., The gentleman read Dickens…) as
compared to literal controls (e.g., The gentleman spotted Dickens…) even though the critical
word consistently appeared as the object of the context-providing verb. The discrepancy
between this finding and those reported here is unlikely to be due to the use of different
types of metonyms (producer-for-product versus place-for-institution) as studies using other
methods have shown difficulty in processing producer-for-product metonyms that appear as
arguments (Rapp et al., 2011; Weiland et al., 2012). One possible explanation is that the
discrepancy is due to greater difficulty in processing the literal sentences in McElree et al.’s
study as compared to those reported here. McElree et al.’s literal condition consisted of
people interacting with famous deceased writers (e.g., The educated slave greeted
Aristotle…; The retired professor welcomed Freud…), whereas those in the current study
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involved conventional action-place pairings (e.g., photographed the college; entered the
academy; Experiment 1) or human role terms that matched the metonyms in length and
frequency (offended the leader; addressed the secretary; Experiment 2). Further research
will be needed to determine whether this explanation is valid or whether the discrepancy has
some other basis. Though they found no evidence of difficulty in metonymic processing,
McElree et al. did find greater difficulty when understanding required object-for-event
coercion (e.g., The gentleman started Dickens…versus The gentleman read Dickens…).
Thus, the McElree et al. pattern of results presents a challenge to our proposal that
comprehension of figurative language, whether it involves coercion or metonymy, is
difficult because of the need to derive a noncanonical interpretation of a word that allows it
to make sense in the context. The degree of processing difficulty might vary with the type of
figurative language or for particular expressions, but this processing difficulty should be
present to some degree when the figurative expression appears as a sentential argument.
Sentence Structure and Metonymic Processing
Several psycholinguistic accounts have proposed that sentence structure is one important cue
that helps guide language processing and indicates to the comprehender which elements of
the sentence should be processed more deeply than others (e.g., Baker & Wagner, 1987;
Ferreira et al., 2002; Gordon & Hendrick, 1998; Sanford & Sturt, 2002). We have argued
that the pairing of an inanimate subject with an action verb (e.g., the pistol injured) or the
use of a metonym as the object of a verb (e.g., offended the college) cause processing
difficulty because the structure of the sentence promotes deep interpretation of a verbal
predicate in relation to its arguments, which in these examples requires a noncanonical
semantic interpretation of the argument. In particular, a verb such as offend typically
requires an object that is human—capable of perceiving some wrongdoing and experiencing
a negative emotional reaction. When instead an inanimate place such as the college appears
as the object, the comprehender must search for an alternate meaning of this word that
satisfies the semantic requirements of the verb. Accordingly, the comprehender comes to
interpret the college not as a literal physical place, but rather as an institution made of
humans who experienced offense. Importantly, this search for an appropriate meaning of
offended the college requires additional processing time in comparison to when the object is
a human (e.g., offended the leader) or when the verb selects an argument that is consistent
with the literal meaning of the metonym (e.g., photographed the college). Similarly, honor
can easily serve as the object of offended. Although not animate per se, honor refers to a
human value that can suffer offense. Thus, in the phrase offended the honor of the college,
the word honor becomes closely tied to the action offend, whereas of the college is a
modifier of honor that is not tightly bound to the main verb of the sentence, and so it is
processed less deeply.
In sum, we propose that syntactic structure is an important aspect of a sentence that guides
processing and provides cues as to which constituents are more important than others. When
the structure of the sentence places a metonym in a focused position, such as the object of
the verb, the comprehender will experience enhanced semantic difficulty due to the need to
derive a noncanonical interpretation of this word. In contrast, adjunct phrases are not as
important to the overall meaning of the sentence, and so a metonym in an adjunct phrase is
typically not processed at a deep semantic level.
We believe that there are several possible mechanisms that might account for this pattern of
effects. First, in line with Frisson and Pickering’s account (Frisson, 2009; Frisson &
Pickering, 1999, 2001), it may be that when a metonym appears in an adjunct phrase the
reader does not fully distinguish between literal and figurative interpretations initially, but
rather adopts a semantically underspecified representation and, if necessary, selects the
intended meaning at a later stage of processing. Because the information contained in an
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adjunct phrase is seen as less important to the overall meaning of the sentence, it is possible
that an underspecified interpretation is sufficient in most cases. A second possibility is that
explicit mention of a feature of the metonym (e.g., honor in offended the honor of the
college) makes that feature particularly salient, thereby reducing focus on the metonym
itself. From this perspective, honor is a known but not usually a primary characteristic of a
college. By promoting this property to a prominent position in the sentence, the
comprehender becomes particularly focused on this now-salient aspect of college at the
expense of processing the information in the adjunct. Finally, the basic structure of an
adjunct seems to indicate that the information it conveys is presupposed. That is, a phrase
such as of the college implies that the college has already been brought into the discourse
(i.e., is “given”) and is now appearing in the sentence simply to modify a new entity (e.g.,
the honor). The use of a definite rather than an indefinite article may further suggest that the
critical word is presupposed; however, the definite article was also used in the Argument
conditions. Thus, any influence from the article indicating that the critical word was
presupposed was consistent across all conditions. We propose that the structure of the
adjunct phrase is an additional source of information that may cue the reader that the
information it conveys is presupposed, as it is being presented not as a focal point of the
sentence, but rather as a modifier. Underspecification of meaning, promotion of a relevant
property, and presupposition are all ways that sentence structure may cause a noncanonical
semantic interpretation to be processed less deeply. These explanations are not necessarily
mutually exclusive; each may explain some aspect of reduction in depth of processing.
Conclusion
Debates over how figurative language is processed have shifted from accounts where a
literal interpretation must be accessed before a figurative interpretation (e.g., Clark & Lucy,
1979; Grice, 1975; Janus & Bever, 1985; Searle, 1979) to accounts where familiar figurative
expressions do not require extra processing effort (e.g., Gerrig & Healy, 1983; Gibbs, 1994;
Gibbs & Gerrig, 1989; Gildea & Glucksberg, 1983; Glucksberg, 1991, 2003; Glucksberg et
al., 1982; Keysar, 1989; Inhoff et al., 1984; Ortony et al., 1978; Shinjo & Myers, 1987), with
most of this research investigating the processing of metaphor. More recent studies
investigating other types of language have provided growing evidence that figurative
expressions often tend to be more difficult to process than literal expressions. These include
studies on the processing of idioms (Cacciari & Tabossi, 1988), proverbs (Honeck, Welge,
& Temple, 1998; Temple & Honeck, 1999), and irony (Dews & Winner, 1999; Giora, Fein,
& Schwartz, 1998; Filik & Moxey, 2010; Schwoebel, Dews, Winner, & Srinivas, 2000).
Even in the realm of metaphor, several recent studies using electrophysiology have
suggested that the processing of metaphorical expressions is more effortful than the
processing of literal expressions (Coulson & Van Petten, 2002, 2007; De Grauwe, Swain,
Holcomb, Ditman, & Kuperberg, 2010; Lai, Curran, & Menn, 2009; Tartter, Gomes,
Dubrovsky, Molholm, & Stewart, 2002). The results of the current study corroborate and
extend these previous findings in demonstrating that metonyms—both familiar and
unfamiliar—are more difficult to process than literal expressions when they are arguments
of the predicate that induces the metonymic interpretation. Importantly, the difficulty
associated with processing a familiar metonym was reduced when it appeared in a position
that is less central to the structure of the sentence. These findings indicate that sentence
structure is a key factor to consider in developing psycholinguistic models that explain the
processing of figurative language.
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Appendix A
The stimuli from Experiment 1 are shown below. Within each set, the first sentence
represents the literal context, whereas the second sentence represents the figurative context.
Within the brackets, the first NP has a familiar metonymic sense, whereas the second NP
does not.
1. With determination, the two women purchased {the convent/the stadium} at the
end of last April, which upset quite a lot of people.
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With determination, the two women disobeyed {the convent/the stadium} at the
end of last March, but did not get a lot of support.
2. Those angry protestors surrounded {the embassy/the cottage}, but not much was
achieved by it.
Those angry protestors debated {the embassy/the cottage}, but not much more
could be done.
3. Finally some of the workmen painted {the store/the sheds}, which really made
everything look prettier.
Finally some of the workmen thanked {the store/the sheds}, which really was a
nice gesture by them.
4. This morning, terrorists bombed {the prison/the statue} in order to gain publicity
for their cause.
This morning, terrorists threatened {the prison/the statue} in order to make their
point a bit clearer.
5. Enthusiastically, the young children approached {the school/the bridge} quite early
on a sunny Wednesday morning.
Enthusiastically, the young children questioned {the school/the bridge} quite early
on a rainy Monday afternoon.
6. To my dismay, the agitated senator damaged {the headquarters/the conservatory},
which was something none of us had been waiting for.
To my dismay, the agitated senator obeyed {the headquarters/the conservatory},
which was something nobody could have prevented.
7. That same day, the husband located {the hospital/the driveway} as soon as he had
been informed about the accident.
That same day, the husband sued {the hospital/the driveway} as soon as he had
heard about the mistake that was made.
8. Over the summer, the writer photographed {the college/the pyramid} after he had
received an official invitation.
Over the summer, the writer offended {the college/the pyramid} after he had bribed
some crooked officials.
9. Last week the professor entered {the academy/the bedroom}, exactly as everyone
had expected him to do.
Last week the professor addressed {the academy/the bedroom}, exactly as I had
wished that he would do.
10. Within an hour, that gentleman accessed {the palace/the cellar}, according to the
newspapers this morning.
Within an hour, that gentleman displeased {the palace/the cellar}, according to the
latest gossip in the tabloids.
11. Two days ago, the criminal destroyed {the consulate/the apartment}, but then he
got arrested the same day.
Two days ago, the criminal notified {the consulate/the apartment}, but then he ran
away in a great hurry.
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12. During the protest, the strikers encircled {the institute/the roadblock}, which was
not something that I advised them to do.
During the protest, the strikers insulted {the institute/the roadblock}, which was not
a very sensible idea after all.
13. An hour later, the businessmen found {the treasury/the building}, which was not
what we had anticipated.
An hour later, the businessmen greeted {the treasury/the building}, which was not
exactly what we wanted.
14. Sometime last night the thief escaped {the court/the tower}, just as his accomplice
had done before him.
Sometime last night the thief provoked {the court/the tower}, just as his partner had
instructed him to do.
15. During vacation, those British visitors toured {the gallery/the highway} and did not
encounter any major problems.
During vacation, those British visitors scolded {the gallery/the highway} and did
not exactly enjoy the experience.
16. On Labor Day, many sightseers explored {the university/the lighthouse}, although
it was an official holiday.
On Labor Day, many sightseers contacted {the university/the lighthouse}, although
it was late in the afternoon.
17. To my amazement, the executives purchased {the convent/the stadium} at the end
of last April, which upset quite a lot of people.
To my amazement, the executives disobeyed {the convent/the stadium} at the end
of last March, but did not get a lot of support.
18. Three days ago, the activists surrounded {the embassy/the cottage}, but not much
was achieved by it.
Three days ago, the activists debated {the embassy/the cottage}, but not much more
could be done.
19. Reluctantly one of the boys painted {the store/the sheds}, which really made
everything look prettier.
Reluctantly one of the boys thanked {the store/the sheds}, which really was a nice
gesture by him.
20. Last year rebels bombed {the prison/the statue} in order to gain publicity for their
cause.
Last year rebels threatened {the prison/the statue} in order to make their point a bit
clearer.
21. After the incident, the concerned father approached {the school/the bridge} quite
early on a sunny Wednesday morning.
After the incident, the concerned father questioned {the school/the bridge} quite
early on a rainy Monday afternoon.
22. To my surprise, the guards damaged {the headquarters/the conservatory}, which
was something none of us had been waiting for.
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To my surprise, the guards obeyed {the headquarters/the conservatory}, which was
something nobody could have prevented.
23. With tears in her eyes, the mother located {the hospital/the driveway} as soon as
she had been informed about the accident.
With tears in her eyes, the mother sued {the hospital/the driveway} as soon as she
had heard about the mistake that was made.
24. Sometime in August, the journalist photographed {the college/the pyramid} after
he had received an official invitation.
Sometime in August, the journalist offended {the college/the pyramid} after he had
bribed some crooked officials.
25. Yesterday afternoon the dean entered {the academy/the bedroom}, exactly as
everyone had expected him to do.
Yesterday afternoon the dean addressed {the academy/the bedroom}, exactly as I
had wished that he would do.
26. One year ago, the reporter accessed {the palace/the cellar}, according to the
newspapers this morning.
One year ago, the reporter displeased {the palace/the cellar}, according to the latest
gossip in the tabloids.
27. Last Tuesday, the traveler destroyed {the consulate/the apartment}, but then he got
arrested the same day.
Last Tuesday, the traveler notified {the consulate/the apartment}, but then he ran
away in a great hurry.
28. At the riot, the teenagers encircled {the institute/the roadblock}, which was not
something that I advised them to do.
At the riot, the teenagers insulted {the institute/the roadblock}, which was not a
very sensible idea after all.
29. Before the interview, the applicants found {the treasury/the building}, which was
not what we had anticipated.
Before the interview, the applicants greeted {the treasury/the building}, which was
not exactly what we wanted.
30. Before sunrise, the drug smuggler escaped {the court/the tower}, just as his
accomplice had done before him.
Before sunrise, the drug smuggler provoked {the court/the tower}, just as his
partner had instructed him to do.
31. For two hours, the expert toured {the gallery/the highway} and did not encounter
any major problems.
For two hours, the expert scolded {the gallery/the highway} and did not exactly
enjoy the experience.
32. On Tuesday, several tourists explored {the university/the lighthouse}, although it
was an official holiday.
On Tuesday, several tourists contacted {the university/the lighthouse}, although it
was late in the afternoon.
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The stimuli from Experiment 2 are shown below. Within each set, the critical NP in the first
sentence is a person, whereas the critical NP in the second sentence is a metonym. Each
sentence was presented with and without the material in the parentheses such that the critical
NP could be the object of the verb or part of an adjunct phrase.
1. With determination, the two women disobeyed (the commands of) the priest at the
end of last April, which upset quite a lot of people.
With determination, the two women disobeyed (the commands of) the convent at
the end of last March, but did not get a lot of support.
2. Those angry protestors debated (the opinions of) the governor, but not much was
achieved by it.
Those angry protestors debated (the opinions of) the embassy, but not much more
could be done.
3. Finally some of the workmen thanked (the clerk sent by) the manager, which really
made everyone happier.
Finally some of the workmen thanked (the clerk sent by) the store, which really
was a nice gesture by them.
4. This morning, terrorists threatened (the competence of) the mayor in order to gain
publicity for their cause.
This morning, terrorists threatened (the competence of) the prison in order to make
their point a bit clearer.
5. Enthusiastically, the young children questioned (the actions of) the teacher quite
early on a sunny Wednesday morning.
Enthusiastically, the young children questioned (the actions of) the school quite
early on a rainy Monday afternoon.
6. To my dismay, the agitated senator obeyed (the orders of) the chairman, which was
something none of us had been waiting for.
To my dismay, the agitated senator obeyed (the orders of) the headquarters, which
was something nobody could have prevented.
7. That same day, the husband sued (the student working for) the doctor as soon as he
had been informed about the accident.
That same day, the husband sued (the student working for) the hospital as soon as
he had heard about the mistake that was made.
8. Over the summer, the writer offended (the honor of) the leader after he had
published that negative article.
Over the summer, the writer offended (the honor of) the college after he had bribed
some crooked officials.
9. Last week the professor addressed (the concerns of) the secretary, exactly as
everyone had expected him to do.
Last week the professor addressed (the concerns of) the academy, exactly as I had
wished that he would do.
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10. Within an hour, that gentleman displeased (the mood of) the queen, according to
the newspapers this morning.
Within an hour, that gentleman displeased (the mood of) the palace, according to
the latest gossip in the tabloids.
11. Two days ago, the criminal notified (a representative of) the diplomat, but then he
got arrested the same day.
Two days ago, the criminal notified (a representative of) the consulate, but then he
ran away in a great hurry.
12. During the protest, the strikers insulted (the reputation of) the president, which was
not something that I advised them to do.
During the protest, the strikers insulted (the reputation of) the institute, which was
not a very sensible idea after all.
13. An hour later, the businessmen greeted (the interns sent by) the director, which was
not what we had anticipated.
An hour later, the businessmen greeted (the interns sent by) the treasury, which was
not exactly what we wanted.
14. Sometime last night the thief provoked (the authority of) the judge, just as his
accomplice had done before him.
Sometime last night the thief provoked (the authority of) the court, just as his
partner had instructed him to do.
15. During vacation, those British visitors scolded (the policies of) the curator and did
not encounter any resistance.
During vacation, those British visitors scolded (the policies of) the gallery and did
not exactly enjoy the experience.
16. On Labor Day, many sightseers contacted (the guides sent by) the administrator,
although it was an official holiday.
On Labor Day, many sightseers contacted (the guides sent by) the university,
although it was late in the afternoon.
17. To my amazement, the executives disobeyed (the commands of) the priest at the
end of last April, which upset quite a lot of people.
To my amazement, the executives disobeyed (the commands of) the convent at the
end of last March, but did not get a lot of support.
18. Three days ago, the activists debated (the opinions of) the governor, but not much
was achieved by it.
Three days ago, the activists debated (the opinions of) the embassy, but not much
more could be done.
19. Reluctantly one of the boys thanked (the clerk sent by) the manager, which really
made everyone happier.
Reluctantly one of the boys thanked (the clerk sent by) the store, which really was a
nice gesture by him.
20. Last year rebels threatened (the competence of) the mayor in order to gain publicity
for their cause.
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Last year rebels threatened (the competence of) the prison in order to make their
point a bit clearer.
21. After the incident, the concerned father questioned (the actions of) the teacher quite
early on a sunny Wednesday morning.
After the incident, the concerned father questioned (the actions of) the school quite
early on a rainy Monday afternoon.
22. To my surprise, the guards obeyed (the orders of) the chairman, which was
something none of us had been waiting for.
To my surprise, the guards obeyed (the orders of) the headquarters, which was
something nobody could have prevented.
23. With tears in her eyes, the mother sued (the student working for) the doctor as soon
as she had been informed about the accident.
With tears in her eyes, the mother sued (the student working for) the hospital as
soon as she had heard about the mistake that was made.
24. Sometime in August, the journalist offended (the honor of) the leader after he had
published that negative article.
Sometime in August, the journalist offended (the honor of) the college after he had
bribed some crooked officials.
25. Yesterday afternoon the dean addressed (the concerns of) the secretary, exactly as
everyone had expected him to do.
Yesterday afternoon the dean addressed (the concerns of) the academy, exactly as I
had wished that he would do.
26. One year ago, the reporter displeased (the mood of) the queen, according to the
newspapers this morning.
One year ago, the reporter displeased (the mood of) the palace, according to the
latest gossip in the tabloids.
27. Last Tuesday, the traveler notified (a representative of) the diplomat, but then he
got arrested the same day.
Last Tuesday, the traveler notified (a representative of) the consulate, but then he
ran away in a great hurry.
28. At the riot, the teenagers insulted (the reputation of) the president, which was not
something that I advised them to do.
At the riot, the teenagers insulted (the reputation of) the institute, which was not a
very sensible idea after all.
29. Before the interview, the applicants greeted (the interns sent by) the director, which
was not what we had anticipated.
Before the interview, the applicants greeted (the interns sent by) the treasury, which
was not exactly what we wanted.
30. Before sunrise, the drug smuggler provoked (the authority of) the judge, just as his
accomplice had done before him.
Before sunrise, the drug smuggler provoked (the authority of) the court, just as his
partner had instructed him to do.
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31. For two hours, the expert scolded (the policies of) the curator and did not encounter
any resistance.
For two hours, the expert scolded (the policies of) the gallery and did not exactly
enjoy the experience.
32. On Tuesday, several tourists contacted (the guides sent by) the administrator,
although it was an official holiday.
On Tuesday, several tourists contacted (the guides sent by) the university, although
it was late in the afternoon.
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